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COMMON LAW, COMMON SENSE: 
FIDUCIARY STANDARDS AND TRUSTEE IDENTITY 
Melanie B. Leslie∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The past twenty years have seen significant changes in the law 
governing trustees’ fiduciary duties.  Though fiduciary duty law is a 
common law creation, recent changes are not a result of common law 
evolution, but legislative action.  The push to codify trust law, including 
fiduciary duties, has come from several sources, including academics, 
who have argued that trust law should be more uniform, and banking 
institutions, which have pushed for legislation to ease the burdens of 
trust management. 
In some significant respects, legislative changes to fiduciary duties 
have not improved upon the common law.  In fact, a few important 
statutes have replaced theoretically sound common law standards with 
rules that undermine the historical objectives of trust law.  In some 
instances, scholars have justified changes by claiming that they are 
necessary to protect the non-professional, poorly counseled trustee.  
Generally, however, it is the large, institutional trustees that have 
benefited—significantly—from the statutory changes in the rules. 
In this Article, I argue that recent statutes would be much 
improved if they differentiated between professionals and non-
professional trustees.  There are critical distinctions between 
professional and non-professionals: differences in settlors’ expectations 
and objectives, negotiation settings, monitoring costs, and the trustees’ 
responses to liability rules.  These distinctions justify having different 
fiduciary standards for different types of trustees. 
Courts, with their case-specific approach to rules, intuitively 
understand that the identity of the trustee should make a difference in 
assessing liability for breach of fiduciary duty.  Whether expressly or 
implicitly, courts gradually have developed two sets of rules.  Thus, 
 
 ∗  Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  For very helpful comments, I 
sincerely thank the Indiana University faculty, Robert Sitkoff, Jeffrey Stake, Stewart Sterk, 
Edward Halbach, and Jonathan Bell.  Marla Decker provided extraordinary assistance with 
research. 
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changing fiduciary standards to protect the non-professional was never 
really necessary. 
This is not to say that legislation never takes account of the 
differences between professional and non-professional trustees.  For 
example, the Uniform Prudent Investor Act clearly explains that non-
professional trustees should be held to a lower standard of care than 
professionals, and the delegation rules provide that the status of a 
trustee is a critical factor in determining whether the trustee properly 
delegated its duties.1  However, trust statutes taken as a whole do not 
reflect consistent attention to this issue. 
I argue in this Article that considering non-professional trustees 
separately from professionals clarifies how fiduciary standards should 
be crafted best to meet the objectives of trust law.  I consider three 
examples: the duty of loyalty, the delegation rules, and the extent to 
which the parties to a trust document ought to be permitted to waive or 
modify fiduciary protections.  In each case, the rules should vary 
depending upon the trustee’s identity.  In each case, courts have 
developed an approach to the issue that appropriately takes the identity 
of the trustee into account.  But in each case, new statutory approaches 
deal with the issue in a less satisfactory way than the common law. 
 
I.     CONTEXTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL 
AND NON-PROFESSIONAL TRUSTEES 
 
In determining how fiduciary rules should be fashioned, it is 
helpful to first identify some key differences between trusts involving 
professional versus non-professional trustees.  The next section 
explores, in brief, four key points of difference: the negotiation setting, 
settlor objectives and expectations, monitoring abilities, and the degree 
to which the trustee is likely to be influenced by the legal rule.  It 
concludes by setting out separate objectives for governing professional 
and non-professional trustees. 
 
A.     Differences in Negotiation Settings 
 
When the settlor engages a professional trustee, the negotiation 
process is often characterized by stark information asymmetries.2  On 
 
 1 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 (a) (1994). 
 2 See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 
94 GEO. L.J. 67, 85-88 (2005) [hereinafter Leslie, Trusting Trustees].  Frank Easterbrook and 
Daniel Fischel, in arguing that fiduciary duties in the corporate setting are, and should be, freely 
  
2006] COMMON LAW,  COMMON SENSE  2715 
 
one hand, the professional trustee is a repeat player and enjoys 
economies of scale in understanding what terms are optimal to the 
trustee and the legal meaning of those terms.3  The settlor, on the other 
hand, may have difficulty understanding the meaning of particular terms 
and how those terms may be interpreted in future circumstances.4 
In the worst case, the settlor may not be represented by 
independent counsel.  The settlor may instead work with an investment 
advisor that sets up the trust (with a document drafted by its legal 
department), explains the document, and then acts as trustee.  A trust 
provision reducing fiduciary duties or exculpating the trustee is 
inconsistent with the essence of the relationship, which is the trustee’s 
explicit or implicit promise to exercise the highest degree of care and 
skill, and to devote its energies to advancing zealously the beneficiaries’ 
and not the trustee’s interests.5  The unrepresented settlor, then, may not 
expect or detect terms that reduce the trustee’s duties or insulate it from 
liability.6  A settlor is even less likely to expect such a term if she has 
chosen as trustee a professional with whom she had a pre-existing 
relationship when the trust was established, such as her investment 
advisor.7 
Of course, many prospective settlors are represented by counsel.  
This fact, however, may not cure information problems at the margins.  
 
waivable default rules, place great emphasis on market forces that provide information or 
compensate for information asymmetries between shareholders and directors.  See FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).  
No comparable market forces exist in the trust context. 
 3 Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2, at 85; cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory 
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1566 (1989) (arguing that, in the 
corporate context, “uncertainty about operation of the customized term is likely to run against the 
prospective shareholder and in favor of the firm” since the firm has greater incentive than the 
shareholder to understand how a particular customized charter term will operate). 
 4 Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2, at 85. 
 5 John Coffee has argued that the asymmetrical information problem exists in the corporate 
context, too, and is a critical problem when a shareholder faces a broad waiver of a fiduciary 
duty; most shareholders will assume that directors will abide by moral constraints for their own 
sake and out of concern for reputation.  John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in 
Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989).  “[W]hen legal 
rules are suspended but nonlegal constraints remain,” he states, “the result is to create 
unproductive uncertainty.”  Id. at 1669.  Coffee argues that a mandatory rule prohibiting a waiver 
that would allow departure from moral norms is efficient.  Id. at 1669-70.  
 6 Bogert, disapproving of corporate trustees’ use of exculpatory clauses, notes that the 
corporate trustee has “advertis[ed] great skill and ability, and impliedly promised to use all that 
care and capacity in any trust where it is chosen trustee.”  See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 340 
(6th ed. 1987). 
 7 Indeed the Uniform Trust Code acknowledges as much, imposing on the trustee the burden 
of proof that the exculpatory clause inserted by the drafter/trustee is “fair under the 
circumstances” and that “its existence and content” are “adequately communicated to the settlor.”  
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008(b) (2005).  However, the UTC goes on to gut the protection that this 
standard ostensibly provides by directing that such a provision is presumed to be fair if the settlor 
was represented by counsel.  See infra text accompanying notes 109-12.  
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Attorneys may be repeat players who seek a stable business relationship 
with professional trustees.  Increasingly, as commercial banks and 
traditional trust companies lose market share to brokerage firms and 
other non-traditional trust providers,8 it is the investment advisor who 
recommends the attorney who reviews the trust document.9  These 
advisors aggressively market trusts to their customers, and are in a 
position to deliver a steady stream of clients to cooperative lawyers.10  
Although many attorneys will serve their clients ably, those attorneys 
who have not fully internalized norms of loyalty and honesty face a 
disincentive to argue too vociferously with institutions who wish to 
modify fiduciary obligations.  This incentive structure has resulted in a 
rash of recent cases imposing disciplinary sanctions against lawyers.11  
 
 8 See V. Gerard Comizio & Jeffrey L. Hare, Regulatory Developments for Banks and Thrifts 
Conducting Trust and Fiduciary Activities, 59 BUS. LAW. 1299 (2004).  The authors establish that 
“banks have traditionally dominated the trust market, but personal trust services are now being 
marketed by a variety of new competitors; as a result, banks have lost market share.”  Id. at 1300.  
They note that, since the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, financial service companies of 
all types are increasingly offering trust services.  Id.; see also DIVERSIFIED SERVS. GROUP, INC., 
PROSPECTUS: TRUST DISTRIBUTION 2002: BUSINESS & DISTRIBUTION MODELS & TACTICS IN THE 
NON-TRADITIONAL TRUST MARKET (2002) (emphasis omitted), http://www.dsg-
candr.com/rmreports/trust_2002_dist.html (stating that “the number of depository institutions 
with trust powers—and assets under management—decreased by 20.1%” over the three years 
ending in 1999); Private Banking . . . Non-Bank Competition Continues to Erode Bank Trust 
Marketshare, CONNECTIONS (The LoBue Group, Las Vegas, N.V.), June 1998, available at 
http://www.lobue.com/about_us/about_connections.html (stating that banks are experiencing an 
“alarming[]” drop in trust business, and that “[s]ince 1990, banks have lost more than half of the 
65% market share they once enjoyed”). 
 9 See, e.g., Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Baker, 492 N.W.2d 695 (Iowa 1992) 
(reprimanding attorney for accepting over 100 referrals from financial services company 
establishing living trusts and failing to advise clients in a disinterested fashion). 
 10 See Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices—Is 
Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 57, 115-25 (1984).  Professor Johnston explains: 
It is a widespread practice among corporate fiduciaries to retain the services of the 
lawyer who drafted a will or trust in which a bank is named as executor or trustee to 
perform any legal work that may be necessary in estate or trust administration.  In 
probating a testator’s estate, legal services are virtually always needed because of the 
strict application of laws relating to unauthorized practice of law, which preclude 
corporate fiduciaries from handling matters processed through the probate court 
system.  The policy of retaining the draftsman to provide legal services has been 
described as a “gentlemen’s agreement” between financial institutions and the bar, as 
“reciprocal back scratching,” as a “symbiotic relationship,” and, less generously, as a 
“conspiracy” between corporate executors and lawyers to exploit the client by 
recommending that the testator name a bank as executor in exchange for assurance that 
the executor, once appointed, will retain the attorney to assist in the probate of the 
testator’s estate. 
Id. at 115 (footnotes omitted). 
  Although this arrangement appears to give the attorney power over the trustee (because the 
trustee wants to induce the attorney to bring it business), it does not seem beyond the pale to 
suppose that some attorneys engaged in this type of symbiotic relationship might agree to trust 
terms simply to keep the relationship on an even keel.  
 11 See, e.g., People v. Laden, 893 P.2d 771 (Colo. 1995) (publicly censuring attorney for 
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When information problems exist, settlors may agree to trust terms that 
are not wealth-enhancing for the trust. 
The asymmetrical information problem is less likely to exist when 
the settlor chooses as trustee a non-professional associate or family 
member.  In this situation, the settlor chooses the trustee because the 
trustee has a relationship with the settlor and the objects of the settlor’s 
bounty, and can be trusted to make discretionary decisions about the 
beneficiaries’ respective needs.  Neither the trustee nor the attorney, if 
any, is a repeat player.  Individual trustees of this sort are unlikely to be 
trustees of other trusts, are less likely to participate in drafting the trust’s 
terms, and are likely to be on a level playing field with the settlor in 
terms of sophistication.12  When the settlor chooses a non-professional 
trustee, therefore, information problems are unlikely to be significant.  
Trust terms that modify fiduciary duties in a specific, narrowly tailored 
fashion are likely to be wealth enhancing. 
 
B.     Differences in Monitoring Costs 
 
When the trustee is a professional, monitoring can be quite costly.  
With the exception of regulators, the trustee is largely immune from 
outside pressures.13  Because trust agreements are private, the 
beneficiaries become the sole monitors of the trustee’s behavior.  Many 
are ill-equipped to read and evaluate complicated financial disclosure 
forms, or to second-guess the professional trustee’s investment 
decisions.14  Indeed, to evaluate whether the trustee is exercising the 
requisite level of care, the beneficiary would need to possess the same 
level of expertise and skill as the trustee itself.15  Because breaches of 
 
aiding trust marketer in the unauthorized practice of law by issuing standard form advice letters in 
response to trust marketer’s clients’ requests for legal advice); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & 
Conduct v. Matias, 521 N.W.2d 704 (Iowa 1994) (suspending lawyer’s license for accepting 
referrals from company that marketed living trusts); In re Mid-Am. Living Trust Assocs., 927 
S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1996) (enjoining living trust company, which sold living trust kits to clients and 
recommended attorneys to those clients, from doing business in Missouri); Cincinnati Bar Assoc. 
v. Kathman, 748 N.E.2d 1091 (Ohio 2001) (suspending attorney from practicing law for aiding 
trust marketer in the unauthorized practice of law and failing to render meaningful legal advice to 
trust marketer’s customers). 
 12 Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2, at 87.   
 13 Fiduciaries are influenced, not just by liability rules, but by social norms.  The liability rule 
makes no difference to the fiduciary who has internalized the social norm of loyalty, because 
loyal behavior is a character trait.  When a fiduciary has failed to internalize a norm, then she will 
engage in a cost/benefit analysis in considering whether to act disloyally.  She will weigh the 
chances and consequences of getting caught against the profit she will make if the transaction 
goes undetected. 
 14 See Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2, at 84-85. 
 15 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. 
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the duty of loyalty often involve trustee self-dealing with closely related 
entities, the beneficiary must understand a complex ownership structure 
and the identity of the trustee’s many affiliates, and be able to determine 
if the trustee’s self-dealing is harmful to the trust.16 
Monitoring of the non-professional trustee may be less costly.  
Because non-professional trusteeships often arise in the context of 
closely-knit family situations, the bonds of love and trust often induce 
trustees to perform with care and loyalty.  In addition, beneficiaries’ 
monitoring tasks may be easier: first, close personal relationships give 
rise to frequent contact.  Moreover, because the non-professional is held 
to a lower standard of care, deviation from that standard may be easier 
to evaluate.  Finally, the self-dealing transactions of the non-
professional trustee are generally of a type that are relatively easy to 
detect, usually involving trustees who borrow or misappropriate trust 
assets. 
 
C.     Differences in the Impact of Liability Rules 
 
Liability rules play an important role in governing the behavior of 
professional trustees.  Professionals know, or certainly should know, the 
substance of the rules that apply to their profession.17  Most are advised 
 
CORP. L. 565, 573 (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 6, 
2003) (recognizing that beneficiaries’ attempts to monitor trustee performance are likely to be 
“inefficient if not ineffective” because monitoring efforts will be “wastefully expensive” and 
suffer from a lack of information, resources, and necessary knowledge and experience). 
 16 See Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to Professor 
John Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 559-60 (2005) [hereinafter Leslie, No Further 
Inquiry Rule]. 
 17 This is not to say that all professional trustees need the incentive provided by a liability 
rule.  Fiduciary standards are legal expressions of obligational social norms.  Social norms are 
standards that are sufficiently ingrained in the culture so that transgression causes self-censure or 
condemnation by others.  See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1257 (1999) (explaining obligational norms); id. at 1265-66 (explaining 
that fiduciary duties are obligational norms).  Eisenberg divides social norms into three 
categories: 1) behavioral patterns “that neither entail a sense of obligation nor are self-consciously 
adhered to or engaged in”; 2) practices that are “self-consciously engaged in” but “do not involve 
a sense of obligation”; and 3) obligational norms, which are “rules or practices that actors not 
only self-consciously adhere to or engage in, but feel obliged in some sense to adhere to or 
engage in.”  Id. at 1256-57.  Eisenberg explains that moral norms are one type of obligational 
norm.  Id. at 1257.  Many, if not most, trustees have internalized these norms; that is, they comply 
because it is “the right thing to do,” even if compliance requires them to forego personal gain.  
When people have internalized norms, the norms, not legal rules, influence and shape behavior. 
 Some actors, however, do not internalize particular social norms.  For these actors, the 
decision whether to transgress entails a cost-benefit analysis, which includes an assessment of the 
chance of getting caught and the social and legal penalties that would result.  As Cass Sunstein 
puts it, “[w]hen defection violates norms, defectors will probably feel shame, an important 
motivational force.”  See Cass R. Sunstein, Symposium: Law, Economics, & Norms: On the 
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by counsel on a regular basis.  Non-professional trustees, on the other 
hand, probably grasp the broad contours of fiduciary norms; they know 
that misappropriating trust funds is wrong, or that failing to pay 
attention to investments is problematic.  But because they are generally 
un-counseled, they are less likely to be aware of the specifics of 
particular trust rules.  Thus, a change in the legal rule will probably 
affect the professional trustee’s behavior, but not the behavior of the 
non-professional. 
 
D.     Differences in Settlors’ Objectives 
 
Settlors and trustees cannot draft agreements that accurately 
anticipate and resolve all future conflicts.18  When the parties have 
failed to stipulate how the trustee should respond to future events, 
fiduciary duties provide guidance.  Fiduciary duties are best understood 
as the terms that the parties would have agreed to ex ante if they had 
anticipated the future conflict and bargaining was costless.19 
Settlors have different reasons for choosing, and different 
expectations about the performance of, professional or non-professional 
trustees.  Consequently, fiduciary standards should vary depending on 
the trustee’s identity. 
Settlors choose professionals because they purport to be experts at 
managing trust assets and effectuating settlors’ long-term objectives.  
For a fee, the expert promises to advocate zealously for the 
beneficiaries’ interests and to subordinate the trustee’s interests to those 
of the trust.  The settlor who chooses the professional trustee expects the 
highest level of professionalism and care. 
Settlors generally have different motivations for choosing non-
professional trustees.  Settlors choose non-professionals because they 
trust their ability to make distribution decisions and deal with family 
conflicts.  Most settlors expect non-professionals to act in good faith 
and to exercise honest judgment; they may not expect non-professional 
trustees to possess a professional’s ability to invest or an expert’s 
knowledge of the law. 
 
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2029-30 (1996).  Legal rules, therefore, 
can play an important role in enforcing compliance with social norms when people have failed to 
internalize those norms. 
 18 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 92; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 426 (1993). 
 19 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 92; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 
426; see also Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 577 (positing that “[i]nstead of getting bogged down in the 
impossibility of specifying conduct ex ante, fiduciary duties supply liability rules that call for an 
‘ex post settling up’ in accordance with what the parties would have bargained for in advance”).  
  





E.     Ramifications 
 
In sum, when the trustee is a professional, the settlor seeks an 
expert level of care and loyalty.  Fiduciary rules should encourage that 
behavior.  Because significant information and monitoring problems 
may exist, fiduciary rules for professional trustees should seek to force 
disclosure in trust creation and management. 
Because non-professionals often will be ignorant of the particulars 
of fiduciary rules, such rules will be less likely to affect their behavior.  
Rules designed to force disclosure will not achieve their objectives.  
Because information and monitoring problems generally are not severe 
when the trustee is a non-professional, the rules’ ineffectiveness is not 
cause for concern.  Instead, rules governing non-professional trustees 
should focus more on effectuation of the settlor’s intent. 
In the following section, I build on these insights to explore how 
fiduciary standards should differ depending on the trustee’s identity. 
 
II.     LIABILITY RULES 
A.     The Duty of Loyalty 
1.     Different Standards for Different Trustees 
 
A trustee breaches its duty of loyalty when it personally profits 
from transacting business with the trust.20  As the following sections 
demonstrate, the standard for determining trustee liability for such a 
breach should vary depending on whether the trustee is a professional or 
non-professional.  Over time, case law has evolved to take account of 
this difference.21  A review of cases from the last decade establishes that 
courts generally do not hold non-professional trustees liable for self-
dealing acts taken in good faith to benefit the trust.22  Professional 
trustees, however, are subject to the no further inquiry rule, which 
requires them to obtain advance approval prior to transacting with the 
 
 20 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2003); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) cmts. c, l (1959). 
 21 See supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text. 
 22 See cases cited infra note 54. 
  
2006] COMMON LAW,  COMMON SENSE  2721 
 
trust.  In the following sections, I develop an analytical framework to 
explain why this doctrinal development is sound. 
Unfortunately, the legislatures and drafters of model statutes have 
taken a path that is radically different than the courts’ approach.  First, 
although statutory changes often have been justified as necessary to 
protect the non-professional trustee,23 statutes offer non-professionals 
no additional protections beyond those that they would receive from 
courts.  In fact, to the extent that courts interpret new loyalty provisions 
as repudiating common law doctrine, statutory changes could leave the 
non-professional trustee with even less protection.24  Second, and more 
importantly, statutory changes to the duty of loyalty have produced 
significant benefits for professional trustees, especially those of the 
large institutional type.  Although section 8 of the Uniform Trust Code 
(the UTC or the “Code”) begins by restating the no further inquiry rule, 
it loosens its grip on institutional trustees in sections 802(c)(4) and 
802(f), which exempt from the rule most types of self-dealing in which 
institutional trustees would seek to engage.25  Instead, institutional 
trustees can self-deal without advance approval, and will escape liability 
if they can show that the transaction was fair to the trust.26  In many 
 
 23 John H. Langbein, Questioning The Trust Law Duty Of Loyalty: Sole Interest Or Best 
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929 (2005). 
 24 Specifically, section 802(c)(4) of the Uniform Trust Code, taken literally, codifies the no 
further inquiry rule for non-professional trustees who transact with the trust.  Although comments 
to the UTC indicate that the common law remains in effect, courts in adopting states might decide 
that the new statute should be applied according to its plain language. 
 25 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(b) (2005) states that “a sale, encumbrance, or other transaction 
involving the investment or management of trust property entered into by the trustee for the 
trustee’s own personal account or which is otherwise affected by a conflict between the trustee’s 
fiduciary and personal interests is voidable by a beneficiary . . . ,” whereas section 802(c)(4) 
states that:  
[a] sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or management of 
trust property is presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary 
interests if it is entered into by the trustee with: . . . (4) a corporation or other person or 
enterprise in which the trustee, or a person that owns a significant interest in the 
trustee, has an interest that might affect the trustee’s best judgment. 
Section 802(f) provides: 
An investment by a trustee in securities of an investment company or investment trust 
to which the trustee, or its affiliate, provides services in a capacity other than as trustee 
is not presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests if 
the investment complies with the prudent investor rule of [Article] 9.  The trustee may 
be compensated by the investment company or investment trust for providing those 
services out of fees charged to the trust if the trustee at least annually notifies the 
persons entitled under Section 813 to receive a copy of the trustee’s annual report of 
the rate and method by which the compensation was determined. 
 26 The comment to UTC section 802 states: 
Under subsection (c), a transaction between a trustee and certain relatives and business 
associates is presumptively voidable, not void.  Also presumptively voidable are 
transactions with corporations or other enterprises in which the trustee, or a person who 
owns a significant interest in the trustee, has an interest that might affect the trustee’s 
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states, the UTC’s adoption has repealed, or is poised to repeal, statutes 
that expressly required trustees to obtain advance approval prior to self-
dealing.27  The UTC relieves institutional trustees of the burden of 
making full disclosure ex ante, and places the burden of detecting and 
objecting to the self-dealing behavior squarely on the beneficiary. 
In the following paragraphs, I explain the no further inquiry rule 
and show why it continues to serve an important function with respect 
to professional trustees.  I also argue that replacing the no further 
inquiry rule with corporate law’s “best interests” defense is unwise 
because significant differences between the corporate and trust law 
settings require different rules.  Finally, I analyze whether the no further 
inquiry rule is equally appropriate for non-professional trustees, and 
conclude that it may be inappropriate.  I also establish that my analysis 
is descriptive as well as normative: in recent decades, case law has 
evolved to create different liability rules for professional and non-
professional trustees who self-deal.  Finally, I turn to recently enacted 
statues, including the UTC, and explore how those statutes should be 
amended to be consistent with my analytical framework. 
 
a.     Professional Trustees and the No Further Inquiry Rule 
 
 
best judgment.  The presumption is rebutted if the trustee establishes that the 
transaction was not affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests.  
Among the factors tending to rebut the presumption are whether the consideration was 
fair and whether the other terms of the transaction are similar to those that would be 
transacted with an independent party.   
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 cmt. (2005) (emphasis added). 
 27 The Uniform Trustee Powers Act (U.T.P.A.) states, “[i]f the duty of the trustee and his 
individual interest, or his interest as trustee of another trust, conflict in the exercise of a trust 
power, the power may be exercised only by court authorization.”  UNIF. TRUSTEE POWERS ACT § 
5 (1964).  Although not widely adopted, of the sixteen states that adopted the U.T.P.A., ten have 
since adopted the UTC, repealing this provision of the U.T.P.A.  The following states adopted the 
Uniform Trustee Powers Act in full or a substantially similar version: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-7235 (2005)), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 737.403 (West 2006)), Hawaii (HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 554A-5 (2004)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 68-108 (2005)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. 
58-1201 to 11 (repealed 2002)), Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.820 (West 2006)), Maine 
(ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.18-A, § 7-404 (repealed 2003)), Michigan (MICH. COMP LAWS ANN. § 
700.7403 (West 2006)), Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-9-111 (2006)), Nebraska (NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 30-2819 to 26 (repealed 2002)), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-A:1 to 
A:11 (repealed 2004)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §45-7-401 (repealed 2003)); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 128.003 to .051 (repealed 2005)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-706 (2005)), 
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-401 to 409 (2005)), and Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-8-101 
to 4-8-1122 (repealed 2003)).  Florida, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming all have since adopted the UTC.  See Unif. Law 
Comm’rs, A Few Facts About the Uniform Trust Code, http://www.nccusl.org/ 
Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utc2000.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2006). 
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Trust law has long imposed a bright-line prohibition against trustee 
self-dealing.28  Historically, a trustee could profit from its position only 
if the settlor had expressly authorized it or if the trustee had obtained 
authorization to act from the court or the beneficiaries.29  Any 
unauthorized transaction involving the trust and the trustee personally 
constituted a breach of the duty of loyalty and was voidable by the 
beneficiary, even if the trustee’s action did not damage the trust.30  
When the trustee engaged in self-dealing, the beneficiaries were entitled 
to choose among a variety of remedies: in addition to rescinding the 
transaction, beneficiaries could seek damages or, more importantly, 
require the trustee to pay all of its profits to the trust.31  Beneficiaries 
could also seek to have the trustee removed.32 
This clear rule prohibiting the trustee’s personal interaction with 
the trust was known as the “no further inquiry rule.”  The rule’s unique 
feature was its strict liability aspect: the trustee had no defense.  In 
marked contrast to corporate law, the trustee was held liable even if the 
transaction was fair to the trust or in the trust’s best interests.  The rule 
was equally applicable to transactions that benefited third persons 
whose interests were intermingled with the trustee’s.33  The trustee was 
prohibited from engaging in transactions with her close family members 
or firms in which she had an interest.34  Historically, professional trust 
companies could not transact business with related firms.35 
There is little doubt that the move away from the no further inquiry 
rule has been influenced by a similar trend in corporate law.36  Although 
 
 28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) cmts. a, l (1959).  The most recent 
preliminary draft of the Restatement (Third) affirms the Restatement (Second)’s approach to the 
duty of loyalty in the main, but recognizes (and thus seems to validate) a troubling new loophole 
for institutional trustees that threatens to undermine the duty of loyalty.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2003) (affirming the duty of loyalty 
generally); id. cmt. c(8) (noting that state statutes allow institutional trustees to invest trust assets 
in proprietary mutual funds). 
 29 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2003) (stating 
that the “duty of loyalty is, for trustees, particularly strict even by comparison to the standards of 
other fiduciary relationships”). 
 30 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2003) (stating 
that under the no further inquiry rule “it is immaterial that the trustee may be able to show that the 
action in question was taken in good faith, that the terms of the transaction were fair, and that no 
profit resulted to the trustee”). 
 31 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 170.2, 206 (1939); BOGERT, supra 
note 6, § 95.   
 32 BOGERT, supra note 6, § 95.  
 33 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmts. c, d, h, i (1992); SCOTT, supra note 31, 
§§ 170.6, 170.10, 170.11, 170.13; BOGERT, supra note 6, § 95.  
 34 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmts. c, d, h, i (1992); SCOTT, supra note 31, 
§§ 170.6, 170.10, 170.11, 170.13; BOGERT, supra note 6, § 95.  
 35 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmts. c, d, h, i (1992); SCOTT, supra note 31, 
§§ 170.10, 170.11, 170.13; BOGERT, supra note 6, § 95.   
 36 Langbein, supra note 23.   
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at the turn of the twentieth century self-interested transactions were 
voidable by shareholders,37 the rule soon evolved to allow directors or 
management to escape liability for breach of the duty of loyalty by 
showing that the transaction was “fair to” or “in the best interests of” 
the corporation.38  Leaving aside the issue of whether the change in 
corporate law was a good one, the trust mechanism is distinct from a 
corporation in ways that explain why trust law stubbornly held on to the 
no further inquiry rule long after corporate law abolished it.  In the 
following paragraphs, I explain why the no further inquiry rule is 
superior to the best interests defense as a liability rule for professional 
trustees. 
There are two key differences between the no further inquiry rule 
and the best interests defense.  The first difference is in the monitoring 
costs created by each rule.  The second concerns the impact that each 
rule has on supporting social norms. 
 
i.     Monitoring Costs 
 
Because beneficiaries and shareholders often detect duty of loyalty 
violations only after the fact, deterrence of disloyal behavior depends on 
the ease with which the beneficiaries or shareholders can hold the 
fiduciary liable.  The best interests defense creates significantly greater 
costs for beneficiaries/shareholders, and thus provides less of a 
deterrent, than the no further inquiry rule.39 
The no further inquiry rule puts the burden of exposing the 
conflict, providing information, and making the case that the transaction 
is in the trust’s best interests squarely on the fiduciary.40  The 
beneficiary’s monitoring tasks are limited to evaluating the information 
before her and monitoring to ensure that the fiduciary is not benefiting 
from its position of trust without advance approval.  The latter task 
requires only that the beneficiary determine whether the trustee or a 
 
 37 See Deborah A. DeMott, The Figure in the Landscape: A Comparative Sketch of Directors’ 
Self-Interested Transactions, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 252-53 (1999) (noting that “any 
contract between a director and the corporation [was] voidable at the corporation’s insistence” 
and that later, “courts may have believed that substantive judicial review [was] more likely to 
detect problematic transactions than [was] submission to shareholders”). 
 38 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 41 (1981) (providing that an interested transaction can be 
validated if it is “fair and reasonable to the corporation”); see also 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 
1504 (2006) (noting that although some statutes recognize the validity of a board resolution 
approving a self-interested transaction, such transactions may be avoided if they are “unfair and 
unreasonable to the corporation”); id. § 1738 (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 41 (1969)).  
 39 See Leslie, No Further Inquiry Rule, supra note 16, at 554-67. 
 40 Id. at 564. 
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related company has a personal interest in a transaction with the trust.  
If so, the beneficiary has a claim for breach. 
By contrast, the best interests defense imposes significantly greater 
monitoring costs on the beneficiary/shareholder.41  Because the rule 
does not require advance approval, trustees seldom will present 
beneficiaries with the information the beneficiaries need to evaluate 
self-dealing transactions.  The beneficiary must not only detect self-
dealing transactions, but also expend resources gathering information to 
evaluate them.  Because this rule does not impose automatic liability, 
the beneficiary’s monitoring task is further increased: she must evaluate 
the transaction to determine whether a court would likely find that the 
transaction is fair to the corporation. 
In the corporate context, a rule that is more costly in terms of 
monitoring expenses may not be troubling because market forces 
support and supplement shareholders’ monitoring efforts.42  Strong 
information markets exist, and fiduciaries’ performance is reflected, in 
some measure, in stock price.43  More importantly, shareholders can 
monitor collectively––some number of shareholders will be financially 
sophisticated, and large institutional investors have strong incentives to 
monitor fiduciary performance.44  Small investors can free ride on those 
efforts.45  If a particular board member or officer wishes to engage in 
self-dealing, other board members have an incentive to scrutinize the 
deal to make sure it is fair to the corporation.  As a result, significant, 
unauthorized self-dealing is often detected.  All of these forces together 
pressure corporate fiduciaries to conform to fiduciary standards. 
By contrast, professional trustees face little to no market 
pressure.46  Trust documents and management decisions are private, and 
neither information markets nor share prices evaluate trustee 
performance.  The entire task of monitoring falls on a few beneficiaries, 
 
 41 Id. at 565. 
 42 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 21 (stating that if corporate charters 
contain disadvantageous terms, “management will pay as investors go elsewhere”); Gordon, 
supra note 3, at 1563-65 (arguing that stock price does telegraph information about charter 
terms); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the 
Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 33-45 (1990) (arguing that markets are efficient and 
that corporate terms are fully reflected in stock price, and concluding that “the presence of play in 
the corporate contract suggests, rather than a failure of contracting, a recognition that the least 
costly way of dealing with agency costs may be to allow them to be checked by incentive or 
monitoring devices instead of by liability rules”). 
 43 See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 42, at 33-45.  
 44  Id. 
 45 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 18-22 (stating that “the price of stocks traded 
in public markets is established by professional investors, not by amateurs” and, drawing on other 
academic literature, arguing that stock price reflects the value of charter terms, which protects 
uninformed investors); see also Gordon, supra note 3, at 1558-59. 
 46 Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2, at 82-84. 
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who must bear a greater proportionate share of the monitoring costs 
than shareholders bear.  In addition, it is probably a safe generalization 
to say that beneficiaries as a whole are poorer monitors than 
shareholders.  Many beneficiaries lack financial acumen, and there is 
nothing equivalent to the institutional investor on which the less 
sophisticated beneficiary can free ride.  Thus, the trust context presents 
significantly less monitoring, and poorer quality monitoring, than does 
the corporate context.47  Because of this disparity, a rule that places the 
burden of disclosure on the trustee makes more sense than one that 
places it on the beneficiary. 
 
ii.     The Impact of Liability Rules 
 
The monitoring difficulties inherent in the trust context make it 
less likely that a fiduciary’s opportunistic behavior will be detected.  It 
is therefore more important that the liability rule create the strongest 
possible deterrent to disloyal behavior.  The no further inquiry rule 
sends the clearest possible message to trustees:48 do not profit from your 
position without obtaining advance approval.49  The remedies afforded 
by the rule are designed to make the stakes for breaching high—the 
trustee who stands to lose profits and face removal might think twice 
before engaging in self-dealing.  In many states, the advance approval 
doctrine has also been codified, which provides even clearer warnings.50 
The corporate standard, on the other hand, sends a murkier 
message.  When some types of opportunism are allowed, fiduciaries, 
particularly those who have not internalized social norms of loyalty, 
may push the boundaries of allowable behavior or rationalize behavior 
that is clearly questionable.  In the corporate context, where market 
discipline is stronger, this fuzziness may not be as troubling.  When 
monitoring is lacking, it is unwise.  Thus, the no further inquiry rule is 
the best rule to apply to professional trustees. 
 
 47 For a discussion on the differences in the monitoring capabilities of beneficiaries and 
shareholders, see Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2, at 77-88. 
 48 The clearer the rule, the easier it is transmitted and understood.  See Error! Main Document 
Only.Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation In Criminal Law, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).  
 49 As Robert Cooter and Bradley Friedman note, “[t]he duty of loyalty must be understood as 
the law’s attempt to create an incentive structure in which the fiduciary’s self-interest directs her 
to act in the best interest of the beneficiary.”  See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Friedman, The 
Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1045, 1074 (1991). 
 50 See supra note 27. 
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b.     The Non-Professional Trustee’s Duty of Loyalty 
 
Historically, the no further inquiry rule applied equally to 
professional and non-professional trustees, at least in theory.  A strong 
case can be made, however, that the rule is an inappropriate liability 
rule for non-professional trustees.  First, beneficiaries’ monitoring tasks 
may be less costly: because non-professional trusteeships often arise in 
the context of closely knit family situations, love, affection, and trust 
often do the work that market pressures perform in the corporate setting.  
Close personal relationships also give rise to frequent contact.  More 
importantly, the self-dealing transactions of the non-professional trustee 
are of a type that are relatively easy to detect, usually involving trustees 
who borrow or misappropriate trust assets.  This is in contrast to self-
dealing transactions by corporate trustees, which often involve 
transactions between the trust and various corporate entities in which 
the corporate trustee has an interest.  To detect self-dealing in this case, 
the beneficiary must understand a complex ownership structure and the 
identity of the trustee’s many affiliates in addition to detecting the 
transaction.51 
Another factor justifying an exception for non-professional trustees 
is the fact that non-professionals generally lack knowledge of the no 
further inquiry rule.  Unlike a professional trustee, which should be 
expected to understand the liability rules governing its profession, the 
non-professional may receive inadequate or no legal advice.52  Imposing 
liability or other sanctions against a trustee whose actions were taken in 
good faith and fair to the trust furthers neither the settlor’s nor the no 
further inquiry rule’s objectives: Most settlors expect good faith and 
honest judgment, but not an expert’s knowledge of the law.  Moreover, 
holding non-professionals strictly liable does not advance the rule’s 
objectives of creating the strongest possible deterrent to self-dealing; the 
rule cannot deter those who are unaware of it.53 
In addition, a significant number of trusts with non-professional 
trustees are family trusts that create a built-in conflict of interest 
between the trustee’s fiduciary obligations and personal interests.  For 
example, a settlor may create a by-pass or credit-shelter trust, naming 
her spouse as trustee and income beneficiary with limited rights to 
 
 51 Leslie, No Further Inquiry Rule, supra note 16, at 559. 
 52 Langbein, supra note 23, at 963. 
 53 For a discussion and examples of alternate reading of case law, see Leslie, No Further 
Inquiry Rule, supra note 16, at 554 (“These cases provide peculiar evidence of overdeterrence, 
because the trustees were not deterred; they simply engaged in self-dealing without obtaining 
advance approval.  That is, these cases involved trustees who did not know the law, and who 
would not have responded to incentives.”). 
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principal distributions, and her children as remaindermen.  Or, a settlor 
might devise shares of a family-owned corporation in trust to benefit his 
descendants, and name a child who controls the company as trustee with 
the power to vote the trust’s shares.  In these situations, that the trustee 
will take actions that benefit herself is practically guaranteed; applying 
the no further inquiry rule to impose liability when the trustee does not 
understand the need to obtain advance approval surely would frustrate 
the settlor’s intent. 
 
 
2.     Common Law, Common Sense 
 
The case can be made, then, that non-professional trustees should 
be judged differently than professionals when they transact with the 
trust without obtaining advance approval.  Increasingly, courts are 
recognizing as much.  A review of case law over the past decade 
establishes that not one court has removed a non-professional trustee or 
imposed personal liability for self-dealing without advance approval 
when the trustee’s self-interested transaction was a good faith attempt to 
benefit the trust and effectuate the settlor’s objectives.54  On the other 
hand, courts find that trustees have breached their duty of loyalty when 
a reasonable person should have known that the self-dealing act would 
 
 54 See Beattie v. J.M Tull Found., No. 97-2746, 1999 WL 222406 (4th Cir. Apr. 16, 1999) 
(reversing district court to hold that trustee who, in good faith, cashed out life insurance policies 
and distributed them to his incapacitated aunt, thereby increasing her estate that he inherited and 
depleting remaindermen’s share, did not breach duty of loyalty because trustee was attempting to 
carry out settlor’s intent); Tays v. Metler, No. 97-2317, 1999 WL 149661 (10th Cir. Mar. 19, 
1999) (holding that husband/trustee of by-pass trust did not breach duty of loyalty when he sold 
his personal property to the trust for cash, because his actions were in good faith and were 
consistent with settlor’s purpose in establishing the by-pass trust); Helman v. Mendelson, 769 
A.2d 1025 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (declining to remove family trustees who borrowed money 
from the trust because the transactions were fair, trustees acted in good faith, and they repaid the 
loans); Massara v. Henery, No. 19646, 2000 WL 1729457 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2000) 
(affirming trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of two family trustees who sold the 
beneficiary’s interest in the family business back to family partnership (of which trustees were 
partners), without beneficiary’s consent, in exchange for the partnership’s promise to pay to the 
trust a fixed sum over six years because trustees were motivated by a desire to guarantee the 
beneficiary a steady income and to prevent him from obtaining additional funds from the trust to 
fuel his drug habit); Warehime v. Warehime, 761 A.2d 1138 (Pa. 2000) (reversing appellate 
court’s application of the no further inquiry rule to find that trustee/son who voted trust’s shares 
to preserve his control over family corporation did not breach his duty of loyalty to trust 
beneficiaries).  But cf. Kinzel v. Kinzel, C.A. No. 95CA006122, 1996 WL 121997 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Mar. 20, 1996) (holding that trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of trustee, 
where trustee held proceeds from sale of trust property in trustee’s personal bank account, and 
remanding for a determination whether this act constituted a breach of the duty of loyalty; a 
proper application of the no further inquiry rule would have eliminated the need for remand to 
consider the fairness of the transaction, and would have resulted in automatic liability). 
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not benefit the trust.55  Although courts are not always clear about what 
standard they are applying, several courts have expressly rejected 
beneficiaries’ arguments that the no further inquiry rule should apply to 
non-professional trustees.56  Indeed, research indicates that in the past 
decade only two appellate courts have approved the application of the 
no further inquiry rule to a non-professional trustee––and in neither of 
those cases did the trustee suffer personal liability or removal for the 
mere fact of self-dealing.57 
 
 55 For example, in Feinberg v. Adolph K. Feinberg Hotel Trust, 922 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1996), the trustee remaindermen, sons of the settlor, failed to make significant income 
distributions to their mother, the income beneficiary, and almost entirely depleted the trust corpus 
by making themselves unsecured loans on extraordinarily favorable terms (on which they 
defaulted) in order to fund their business ventures.  In addition to awarding damages, the court 
directed the trustees to pay the income beneficiary’s attorney’s fees.  See also Sanford v. Sanford, 
355 Ark. 274 (2003) (holding that husband/trustee breached duty to ex-wife beneficiary when he 
took unauthorized trustee compensation and sold trust property and kept her share of the proceeds 
to repay her alleged debts to him, which left her with no funds to pay capital gains tax); Hosey v. 
Burgess, 319 Ark. 183 (1995) (trustee/remainderman breached duty by subleasing trust property 
and keeping the profit); Sullivan v. Hellgren, No. B164017, 2004 WL 831178 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 
19, 2004) (finding trustee/beneficiary breached duty to brother/beneficiary by transferring family 
home from trust to herself, selling the home, keeping the proceeds, and rendering the trust 
worthless); White v. Pierson-Anderson (In re Estate of Heyn), 47 P.3d 724 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) 
(stating that when the beneficiary can show self-dealing, the trustee can rebut the charge by 
showing that the transaction was fair and reasonable, and finding trustee liable because he lived 
rent-free in the apartment building that was held in trust); Aiello v. Hyland, 793 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (awarding damages and removing trustee who attempted to sell trust 
property at below-market value to brother with whom trustee was in business); Deutsch v. Wolff, 
994 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1999) (upholding determination that trustee was liable on an outstanding 
loan from trust to partnership in which trustee and one beneficiary were partners); John R. Boyce 
Family Trust v. Snyder, 128 S.W.3d 630 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding trustee liable for breach of 
fiduciary duty because he convinced beneficiary to consent to the use of trust assets to buy a store 
from trustee by misrepresenting his reasons for selling and the store’s financial position; store 
went bankrupt); Coffey v. Coffey, 286 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 1995) (finding settlor/trustee of 
trust for divorced settlor’s children liable for breach of duty of loyalty when he improperly used 
trust assets to satisfy his personal financial obligations to his children, used trust funds to pay his 
legal bills, and co-mingled trust assets with his own); In re Dentler Family Trust, 873 A.2d 738 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (surcharging co-trustees (settlor’s son and his lawyer) for, among other 
things, trading trust assets on margin to raise cash in order to make a large distribution to trustee’s 
son at the expense of the other trust beneficiaries).   
 56 See, e.g., Tays, 1999 WL 149661 (following the law of several states to hold that when 
settlor created the conflict of interest between trustee’s fiduciary and personal interests, the 
trustee is liable for breach only when acting in bad faith, dishonestly, or intentionally against the 
interest of the trust); Helman, 769 A.2d at 1051-52 (rejecting beneficiary’s claim that the no 
further inquiry rule should apply when trustee loaned himself trust funds); Massara, 2000 WL 
1729457 (holding that the no further inquiry was inapplicable and placing the burden on the 
beneficiary to show that he was damaged by the trustee’s action); Warehime, 563 Pa. 400 
(holding that the appellate court erred as a matter of law in applying the no further inquiry rule 
because a “good faith” standard was more appropriate).   
 57 See Stegemeier v. Magness, 728 A.2d 557 (Del. 1999) (indicating trustees who sold real 
property held in trust to themselves, developed it, and sold it at a profit might be found not liable 
on remand so long as they could demonstrate that they paid fair market value, which, as the 
dissent pointed out, seemed likely given that trustee’s expert trial witness already provided 
significant evidence in support of that fact); In re Estate of Stevenson, 605 N.W.2d 818 (S.D. 
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In sum, courts are protecting non-professional trustees from 
liability when doing so effectuates settlors’ intent and does not 
undermine the deterrent effect of the no further inquiry rule.  Yet the no 
further inquiry rule, with its advance approval requirement, is the 
appropriate rule for professional trustees.  Unfortunately, as I establish 
in the following sections, statutes enacted in recent years fail to address 




3.     Statutory Shortcomings 
 
As we have seen, case law is evolving to create two distinct 
liability rules for professional and non-professional trustees.  The past 
twenty years have seen a surge of interest in codifying the law of trusts.  
Insofar as codification restates and integrates the common law, it 
presents few problems.  Some key statutes codifying the duty of loyalty, 
however, significantly depart from, and in some instances entirely 
repudiate, settled duty of loyalty principles.  In particular, statutory 
departures from the no further inquiry rule create significant benefits for 
the professional trustee at the expense of the beneficiary, and fail to 
reflect changes in the case law that protect the non-professional.  More 
troubling, no one has given a persuasive justification for either problem. 
 
a.     Uniform Trust Code Section 802 and Exceptions to the No Further 
Inquiry Rule 
 
Section 802 of the UTC, the duty of loyalty provision, could be 
significantly improved by giving greater attention to the differences 
between professional and non-professional trustees.  First, a quibble: the 
Code arguably could afford more protection to the non-professional 
trustee than it currently does.  The comments appropriately 
acknowledge the plight of the inherently conflicted non-professional 
trustee and suggest that a settlor’s appointment of a conflicted trustee 
may constitute an implied waiver of the duty of loyalty.58  However, a 
 
2002) (applying no further inquiry rule, and allowing beneficiaries to void trustee’s leases of trust 
property to trustee’s husband and to trustee’s husband’s relatives; trustee suffered no personal 
liability).   
 58 Presumably, the comments mean to suggest that a conflicted trustee’s acts should be 
judged by a “best interest of the trust” standard, and not that a conflicted trustee’s self-interested 
acts are per se valid. 
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non-conflicted non-professional who transacts business directly with the 
trust without advance approval may be subject to the no further inquiry 
rule,59 which the Code affirms is applicable to all trustees except as 
otherwise provided.60  Of course, there is a good reason to set out the no 
further inquiry rule as the black letter law applicable to all trustees: if a 
non-professional trustee consults a lawyer prior to engaging in a 
conflicted transaction, it is best if the lawyer advises her to seek 
advance approval.  However, because the statute seems clear on its face, 
some courts might read it as a repudiation of cases that apply a “best 
interests” test to actions taken by non-professional trustees.  The 
comments could clarify that the statute does not abrogate common law 
doctrine. 
More troubling, section 802(c) creates an enormous exception from 
the no further inquiry rule for professional trustees, one that represents a 
reversal of the common law.  The ill-advised loophole seems to be an 
extension of case law that existed to protect individual trustees.  
Because the exception makes sense only in the case of non-
professionals, the extension to benefit professional trustees is 
unwarranted. 
Specifically, the model statute lists a variety of transactions that 
give rise to only a rebuttable presumption of improper self-dealing.  The 
trustee may rebut the presumption of self-dealing by establishing that 
“the transaction was not affected by a conflict between personal and 
fiduciary interests.”61  In determining whether the trustee has met its 
burden, the court may consider factors such as “whether the 
consideration was fair and whether the other terms of the transaction are 
similar to those that would be transacted with an independent party.”62 
 
 59 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) (2005). 
 60 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) & (b) (2005) provide: 
(a)  A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries. 
(b)  Subject to the rights of persons dealing with or assisting the trustee as provided in 
Section 1012, a sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or 
management of trust property entered into by the trustee for the trustee’s own personal 
account or which is otherwise affected by a conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary and 
personal interests is voidable by a beneficiary affected by the transaction unless: 
(1)  the transaction was authorized by the terms of the trust; 
(2)  the transaction was approved by the court; 
(3)  the beneficiary did not commence a judicial proceeding within the time 
allowed by Section 1005; 
(4)  the beneficiary consented to the trustee’s conduct, ratified the transaction, or 
released the trustee in compliance with Section 1009; or 
(5)  the transaction involves a contract entered into or claim acquired by the 
trustee before the person became or contemplated becoming trustee. 
 61 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 cmt. (2005). 
 62 Id. 
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Thus, for particular transactions, the statute replaces the no further 
inquiry rule with what is essentially a corporate “fairness” standard.  
Those transactions include transactions between the trustee and 1) the 
trustee’s spouse, 2) the trustee’s relatives, 3) the trustee’s agents and 
attorneys, and 4) “a corporation or other person or enterprise in which 
the trustee, or a person that owns a significant interest in the trustee, has 
an interest that might affect the trustee’s best judgment.”63  Only 
exception two has significant, though not solid, support in the common 
law.64  Exception one, which finds some support in case law, can be 
justified as a logical extension of exception two.  The comments are 
silent as to why exceptions were made for the employees, agents, and 
affiliates of professional trustees. 
One possibility is that the drafters simply viewed exceptions three 
and four as natural extensions of the “indirect self-dealing” rule 
articulated by Austin Wakeman Scott.  According to Scott, 
the mere fact that the purchaser [of trust property] is related to the 
trustee is not of itself a sufficient ground for voiding the sale.  It is, 
however, a circumstance to be considered in determining whether the 
sale was made in the best interests of the beneficiaries and if on all 
the facts it appears that the trustee sold the property for less than he 
could have obtained from others or otherwise abused his discretion 
in making the sale, the trustee is guilty of a breach of trust . . . .65 
The cases that Scott cites as support involve non-professional 
family trustees or executors who sold trust property to relatives to 
benefit the estate or trust.  This exception to the no further inquiry rule, 
to the extent it existed,66 is best understood as courts’ attempt to protect 
the non-professional family fiduciary who dealt fairly with the testator’s 
estate or trust but neglected to obtain advance approval.  It is consistent 
with the idea that the no further inquiry rule should not be applied when 
doing so would violate the settlor’s intent.  The exception cannot, 
however, serve as a basis for shielding professional trustees from 
liability when they deal with employees, or with related entities in 
which they have a significant interest. 
To the extent the Code’s exceptions benefit professional trustees, 
they are unsound.  First, the rule eliminates incentives for professional 
trustees to bargain with settlors for authorization to deal with related 
 
 63 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(c)(4) (2005). 
 64 SCOTT, supra note 31, § 170.6; BOGERT, supra note 6, § 95.  There are some courts that 
recognize the spouse exception, however others have soundly rejected it. 
 65 SCOTT, supra note 31, § 170.6. 
 66 Bogert rejected the idea that these transactions are exempt from the no further inquiry rule, 
stating “[t]he rule against self-dealing extends to transactions with a firm of which the trustee is a 
member, a corporation in which he has a controlling or substantial interest, and with a spouse, 
agents, employees and other persons whose interests are closely identified with those of the 
trustee.”  BOGERT, supra note 6, § 95.  
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entities.  Second, the rule greatly increases beneficiaries’ monitoring 
costs; it creates a disincentive for trustees to disclose the details of the 
transaction to the beneficiaries before the fact because failure to do so 
does not constitute a breach of duty.  As a result, beneficiaries must 
ferret out all self-dealing. 
Moreover, the UTC rule increases beneficiaries’ litigation burden, 
and in so doing weakens the law’s role as a deterrent to self-dealing.  
Instead of limiting beneficiaries’ burden to determining whether the 
trustee is transacting with affiliates, the rule requires beneficiaries to 
evaluate the transaction in question to determine whether a court will 
find the transaction was affected by a conflict of interest.  This means 
the beneficiary must understand and evaluate alternative choices the 
trustee might have made and determine whether a court will likely find 
that the transaction was “fair,” a dubious enterprise which the no further 
inquiry rule eliminated.  Moreover, because the trustee will not face 
liability as long as the transaction was fair, the UTC rule eliminates an 
important incentive the no further inquiry rule created: the incentive to 
advocate zealously for the trust.  After all, why should the trustee 
expend additional effort to get the best deal for the trust if the trustee 
will not be held liable for settling for a transaction that is simply fair 
and that also generates benefits for the trustee’s affiliates?  Finally, the 
exception for professional trustees is not required on grounds of 
fairness.  Surely professionals should know the law requiring them to 
obtain approval before transacting with related businesses. 
Because institutional trustees increasingly are merged with or 
related to other types of banking and investment institutions,67 almost 
all of the self-dealing in which they would be tempted to engage 
involves an affiliate.  For institutional trustees, then, the exception set 
forth in section 802(c)(4) swallows the no further inquiry rule whole, 
creating significant costs for beneficiaries.  No compelling reason exists 
for displacing the no further inquiry rule’s thoughtful incentive structure 
with a rebuttable presumption. 
 
b.    Statutes That Authorize Trustees to Invest in 
Proprietary Mutual Funds 
 
In the past fifteen years, the vast majority of states have enacted 
statutes providing that a trustee’s investment in proprietary mutual 
funds is not a breach of the duty of loyalty,68 even though the trustee’s 
 
 67 See Leslie, No Further Inquiry Rule, supra note 16, at 573-74.  
 68 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.90.010 (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-71-104 (2004); CAL. 
PROB. CODE § 16015 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-8-2 (1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 412:8-
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related or parent company collects commissions and fees in its capacity 
as an investment bank.  It is important to emphasize that, unlike section 
802(c) of the UTC, which creates a rebuttable presumption of breach, 
these statutes create no presumption at all.  As long as the investment is 
consistent with the prudent investor rule, the trustee has not breached a 
duty. 
These statutes do not compensate for information asymmetries in 
the negotiation process.  They completely reverse the centuries-old 
common law rule, and require a settlor to bargain for the protection the 
duty of loyalty formerly provided.  If the settlor’s lawyer fails to inform 
the settlor of this issue out of a desire to obtain repeat business from the 
trust company, the settlor probably will not understand that the trust 
agreement creates an incentive for the trustee to invest in its own 
investments instead of others that might better serve the trust. 
In addition, these statutes dramatically increase beneficiaries’ 
monitoring costs.  They remove all incentive for the trustee to make full 
disclosure to the beneficiary prior to transacting.  They require the 
beneficiary to determine whether the proprietary mutual funds managed 
by the trustee, or the trustee’s affiliate, are sufficiently inferior to other 
funds to constitute proof that “the trustee . . . place[d] its own interests 
ahead of those of the beneficiaries.”  If the investment does seem 
substandard, the beneficiary’s litigation burdens will be greater: instead 
of disposing of the liability issue on summary judgment, as the no 
further inquiry rule would, the new statutes will require a trial to 
determine whether the trustee breached its duty. 
Finally, statutes permitting trustees to invest trust assets in their 
own mutual funds fail to create the maximum incentives for trustees to 
work zealously to advance the trust’s best interests.  A trustee need no 
longer subordinate its interests to those of the trust.  Instead, it can profit 
from its position as trustee as long as the conflicted investment is “good 
enough.” 
A few state statutes take monitoring problems more seriously, and 
require the trustee to obtain beneficiaries’ consent to such activity in 
writing,69 or, best of all, force trustees to choose between earning trustee 
commissions or mutual fund commissions.70  Many statutes mitigate 
 
400 (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 68-404A (2004); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/5.2 (2004); IND. 
CODE § 28-1-12-3 (1998); IOWA CODE 633.123A (2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.020 (West 
2006); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-106 (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
487.14405 (West 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 362.550 (2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 709.175 (2003); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-302 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-3-117 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
75-7-402 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.035 (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-6-9 
(LexisNexis 2004); WIS. STAT. § 881.01 (2003-2004). 
 69 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3205 (2005). 
 70 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.18-A, § 7-408 (1997); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-
2.2 (McKinney 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.55 (West 1997). 
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monitoring problems slightly by requiring the trustee to provide a 
statement explaining how its commissions were calculated.  The UTC, 
in section 802(f), adopts the approach of these states. 
These statutes, however, do not go far enough.  A far better 
approach would be to require trustees to obtain settlor or beneficiary 
approval in writing, and to impose on trustees the burden to prove that 
they made full disclosure.  This would telegraph to the settlor or 
beneficiary the need to renegotiate trustee commissions. 
In sum, these statutes discourage disclosure, increase monitoring 
costs, and fail to encourage professional trustees to get the best deal for 
the trust.  It is difficult to attribute this sea change in the law to anything 
other than effective lobbying by banks. 
 
 
B.     Delegation Rules 
1.     Different Rules for Different Trustees 
 
Another area of trust law that has been reversed in recent years is 
non-delegation doctrine.  Prior to the mid 1990s, black letter law 
prohibited a trustee from delegating any function the trustee could 
“reasonably be required personally to perform.”71  If the trustee properly 
delegated to an agent who thereafter damaged the trust, the trustee was 
liable only if it had been negligent in choosing and supervising the 
agent.  If the trustee made an improper delegation, however, it was 
liable for all damage caused to the trust by the agent. 
Historically, courts viewed the trustee’s investment function as an 
act that the trustee was “reasonably . . . required personally to perform.”  
Thus, trustees that delegated that function were held personally liable 
when the investment agent caused losses to the trust.  Over time, as 
investing increased in complexity, academics and practitioners alike 
argued that the prohibition on delegation of the investment function 
should be reversed.  Allowing trustees to delegate investment decisions, 
they argued, would better serve beneficiaries’ interests by ensuring that 
trust assets were invested in accordance with professional standards.  
Reversing the doctrine also would assist the settlor who preferred to 
appoint a family member as trustee but was hesitant to do so because of 
that individual’s lack of investing expertise.72  Finally, some argue that 
 
 71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959). 
 72 John H. Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59 MO. L. 
REV. 105, 106, 110 (1994) [hereinafter Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule]; UNIF. 
PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 cmt. (1994); John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act 
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the non-delegation rule hurts only those beneficiaries serviced by non-
professional trustees with no investment experience because, unlike 
their professional counterparts, these trustees would not be savvy 
enough to draft around the rule.73 
Undoubtedly, a rule flatly prohibiting all trustees from delegating 
investment functions is unwise.  Yet reversing the non-delegation rule 
raises another set of questions.  First, what limits, if any, should be 
placed on a trustee’s power to delegate?  Second, how does a trustee’s 
delegation of the investment function affect its fiduciary duties to trust 
beneficiaries?  Third, should the trustee’s agents owe fiduciary duties 
directly to the trust beneficiaries?  I argue in the following section that 
the answers to these questions should depend on whether the trustee is a 
professional or a non-professional. 
a.     Delegation and the Professional Trustee 
 
This Article has established that background rules for professional 
trustees should create strong incentives to 1) provide full information to 
settlors during the trust creation process and craft any modifications of 
fiduciary rules narrowly and specifically, 2) provide full and fair 
disclosure to beneficiaries prior to deviating from the settlor’s 
reasonable expectations, and 3) perform to the highest level of 
professional standards consistent with the settlor’s intent.  A rule that 
allows professional trustees to delegate the investment function should 
reflect those objectives. 
When a professional trustee properly delegates, what implications 
should that have with respect to the trustee’s continued liability to the 
beneficiaries?  There are three options: 1) a rule that relieves the trustee 
from all liability if the agent harms the trust, 2) a rule that holds the 
trustee liable only if its failure to carefully select and supervise the 
agent contributes to the trust’s losses, or 3) a rule that makes the trustee 
liable for losses caused by its agent.  The first option is unwise for 
obvious reasons.  In the following paragraphs, I argue that professional 
trustees should be held liable for the acts of their investment agents, 
regardless of whether the trustee is negligent in choosing or supervising 
that agent.  This background rule would best effectuate the settlor’s 
intentions and address the problems inherent in the professional trustee 
context. 
First, a strict liability rule is probably the rule the settlor would 
have agreed to if he had thought about the issue during the drafting 
process.  The settlor chose the trustee largely because of its expertise in 
 
and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 650 (1996). 
 73 Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule, supra note 72, at 109-10. 
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trust management.  Presumably, then, the settlor would expect the 
trustee to delegate the investment function only in rare instances.74  A 
strict liability rule pressures trustees to delegate only when doing so 
would make the beneficiaries better off, but does not inhibit necessary 
delegation—if the trustee knows it lacks the skills to handle particular 
investment duties, delegating will be a superior choice to not delegating, 
even if the trustee will face liability for the agent’s acts.  The rule 
creates incentives to use maximum care in selecting and monitoring an 
agent, and protects the beneficiaries from being harmed through no fault 
of their own.  By contrast, a rule holding the trustee liable only for 
negligent supervision may unnecessarily encourage delegation––the 
trustee will actually have less exposure to liability if it delegates than if 
it does not.  Although reasonable limits on the power to delegate might 
mitigate this problem, if courts review decisions to delegate under an 
abuse of discretion standard, the incentive to delegate will still exist.75 
Second, a strict liability rule would best force trustees who intend 
to delegate to negotiate with the settlor for permission, and to craft the 
terms of trustee liability.76  This process would highlight issues such as 
how delegation of the investment function should affect the trustee’s 
compensation, providing clearer guidance for both the trustee and the 
beneficiaries in the years to come.  Trustees who later raise a trust 
provision releasing them from liability for the agent’s acts would have 
the burden to show that the settlor possessed full information about the 
meaning and existence of the clause.  This could be easily accomplished 
if the trust provides for a reduced trustee commission in the event of 
delegation. 
Third, when a trust document fails to authorize the trustee to 
delegate the investment function, a rule holding the trustee liable for the 
acts of its agent would encourage trustees to seek permission in advance 
from trust beneficiaries, reducing beneficiaries’ monitoring costs.  This 
prior disclosure would also highlight for the beneficiaries the need to 
discuss how delegation will affect trustee compensation. 
By contrast, a rule holding the trustee liable only if it is negligent 
in choosing or monitoring its agents exacerbates the information and 
monitoring problems that exist in the professional trustee context.  The 
rule creates no incentive to bring the delegation issue to the settlor’s 
attention during the negotiation process, nor to seek beneficiary 
 
 74 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. j (1992). 
 75 Comments to the Third Restatement draft read that the trustee is not expected to personally 
perform the investment decision-making function “even if the trustee is a professional or 
institutional fiduciary with competence and experience in financial matters.”  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. f(1) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005). 
 76 Many professional trustees already routinely engage in this practice.  See Langbein, 
Reversing the Nondelegation Rule, supra note 72, at 109-10, 118. 
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approval prior to delegating.  The rule leaves it up to the beneficiary to 
determine when the trustee has delegated its investment function, and to 
take the initiative in getting the trustee to adjust its commission 
structure if the trustee fails to do so.  Moreover, because the beneficiary 
will bear the risk of loss if the agent harms the trust, this rule places 
additional unjustified burdens on the beneficiary, not only to monitor 
the trustee, but also to monitor the agent. 
Although the “negligence” rule creates some incentive to monitor, 
it does little to protect the beneficiary if the agent commits a spectacular 
one-shot breach, such as appropriating trust funds or committing other 
acts of self-dealing.77  Routine monitoring cannot anticipate and prevent 
one-shot breaches.  Making the trustee personally liable for such 
breaches will not generally harm the trustee, because trustees can 
continue to draft around the rule,78 and because if they fail to do so, they 
have a claim against the breaching agent, assuming that agent is solvent.  
So the question boils down to this: who should bear the cost of an 
agent’s breach (both litigation costs and the harm to the trust) if the 
agent is judgment-proof?  The trustee, who chose the agent and can 
spread the loss, or the beneficiary, who had nothing to do with the 
decision but would bear the full loss by itself?  Common sense says that 
most settlors would prefer a default rule that imposes liability on the 
trustee.  In choosing a professional trustee, the settlor is foregoing the 
advantage of personal trust administration in favor of the superior 
investment and management skills of a professional trustee.  It is 
unlikely that they would expect the beneficiaries to bear the loss in the 
event that the trustee decides to delegate responsibility to a judgment-
proof agent. 
 
b.     Delegation and the Non-Professional Trustee 
 
On the other hand, imposing strict liability on the non-professional 
trustee when an agent harms the trust is probably not the default rule 
most settlors would prefer.  When the settlor chooses a family member 
or friend whom the settlor knows is inexperienced with investing, it is 
reasonable to believe that the settlor expected and would want the 
trustee to delegate the investment function to a more qualified person or 
entity.  In fact, unless the settlor has appointed a professional co-trustee, 
the settlor probably expects that the trustee will delegate the investment 
function to some degree, even if only by investing in mutual funds.  
Delegation allows the beneficiary to benefit from personal trust 
 
 77 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 103.  
 78 Id. 
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administration without having to sacrifice the quality of the investment 
decisions required to protect and grow trust assets.  Not imposing 
liability on a non-professional who delegates to an investment agent is 
consistent with the spirit of the old non-delegation rule.  The trustee 
could always delegate tasks that the settlor did not intend for him to 
perform personally, and when the delegation is proper, the trustee 
would not be liable for acts of an agent reasonably selected and 
supervised.79  The modern settlor no more expects a non-professional 
trustee to be an investment professional than she expects him to provide 
legal services, a delegation that has always been proper.80  Finally, 
because the non-professional cannot spread the risk of loss, there is less 
reason to think that the settlor would want to the trustee rather than the 
trust to absorb the loss. 
Moreover, because trustee’s agent will possess a higher level of 
expertise than the trustee, the trustee’s abilities to evaluate and monitor 
the agent are limited.  Most settlors would probably want to impose 
liability only if the trustee is negligent in choosing or supervising the 
agent.  And when the non-professional trustee takes no commission, 
beneficiaries will not be harmed if the trustee’s agent charges fees. 
 
2.     Common Law, Common Sense 
 
Although conventional wisdom holds that the common law non-
delegation rule was flat wrong, in this Article, I take the controversial 
position that the common law was not as far from the mark as it first 
appears.  First, although the prohibition against delegating the 
investment function ostensibly applied to all trustees, courts rarely 
found non-professionals liable for improper delegation if the trustee 
used due care in monitoring the agent.  Second, the common law rule 
holding professional trustees liable for the acts of an investment agent 
was correct, but for the wrong reasons. 
First, courts often accounted for the status of the trustee in 
determining when to impose liability for improper delegation.  Prior to 
the changes in the non-delegation rule, courts did not routinely impose 
liability when a non-professional trustee violated the non-delegation 
doctrine by delegating categorically discretionary functions.  For 
example, in 1943, long before the trend towards permissive delegation 
began, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to surcharge an 
executor who signed an agency agreement with a bank that allowed the 
bank to suggest suitable investments without assuming responsibility 
 
 79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 171, 225 (1959). 
 80 Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule, supra note 72, at 108. 
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for the outcome of the recommendations.  The record showed that the 
executor did in fact delegate more than just ministerial tasks.  The court, 
however, emphasizing the executor’s diligent review of the bank’s 
actions, and approval of transactions, refused to surcharge the executor 
for breach.81 
On the other hand, courts imposed liability on non-professional 
trustees when the trustee blatantly failed to supervise the activities of 
the agent and the trustee’s prolonged negligence exacerbated the trust’s 
losses.  For example, in Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children v. 
Gardiner, a case often cited for the proposition that delegation of 
investment authority is improper, the trustee simply turned over all 
investment decisions to an embezzling stockbroker.  Although the court 
cited the non-delegation rule as justification for its decision, the court 
also emphasized that the trustee provided absolutely no supervision and 
took no care to monitor or review the acts of the agent.82  In short, the 
case law does not reveal heavy-handed imposition of strict liability 
against non-professional trustees who delegated and diligently 
monitored in good faith.  Instead, the case law appears to be reasonably 
consistent with the current delegation rule. 
Second, cases imposing liability on professional trustees for the 
acts of their investment agents reach the correct result, for perhaps the 
wrong reasons.  Although a rule permitting appropriate delegation is 
certainly the better approach, at least today, it does not follow that the 
trustee’s fiduciary duties should be reduced simply by the unilateral 
decision to delegate.  The end result of the old rule, which is that 
trustees were liable for breaches of duty by the investment agent, is 
sound. 
 
3.     Statutory Shortcomings 
 
 
 81 In re Kohler’s Estate, 33 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1943); see also In re Quinlan’s Estate, 273 A.2d 
340 (Pa. 1971) (finding non-professional executor who improperly delegated to bank the power to 
negotiate sale of trust-owned business should not be removed as trustee because he acted in good 
faith and on advice of counsel). 
 82 Shriners Hosps. For Crippled Children v. Gardiner, 733 P.2d 1110 (Ariz. 1987); see also 
Gaines v. Dahlin, 154 So. 101 (Ala. 1934) (voiding agreement between trustee and bank because 
it conferred absolute discretion on bank to invest, and prohibited trustee from interfering for ten 
years); In re Will of Hartzell, 192 N.E.2d 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 1963) (finding trustee in breach for 
allowing embezzling attorney to hold funds from sale of trust property without inquiry and 
without ever requiring an accounting); In re Will of Jones, 765 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sur. Ct. 2003) 
(declining to approve power of attorney by trustee to co-trustee, since it would result in 
delegation without supervision); Abrams v. U.S. Fid. & Guarantee Co., 106 N.W. 1091 (Wis. 
1906) (holding guardian liable for losses for failing to supervise embezzling attorney who 
collected, retained, and invested insurance proceeds for orphaned children).   
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Both the Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the UTC provide that 
1) trustees’ delegation authority varies depending on the identity of the 
trustee and the purpose of the trust and 2) the trustee’s agent owes 
fiduciary duties to the trust, but that 3) if the trustee’s agent causes the 
trust harm, the trustee is personally liable only if the trustee acted 
negligently in selecting, directing, or monitoring the agent.83  The 
drafters appropriately considered the differences between professional 
and non-professional trustees in terms of the scope of permissible 
delegation.  Yet the rule’s liability provisions could have been better 
crafted to account for this difference.  The provisions concerning the 
trustee’s liability to the trust for the agent’s acts are best suited to the 
case of the non-professional trustee.  As applied to professional trustees, 
however, the statute could create a better incentive structure. 
In explaining the decision to hold trustees liable for their agents’ 
acts only on a showing that the trustee was negligent, the drafters 
acknowledge that there is “an intrinsic tension” between “granting 
trustees broad powers that facilitate flexible and efficient trust 
administration, on the one hand, and protecting trust beneficiaries from 
the misuse of such powers on the other hand.”84  Ultimately, however, 
they determine that imposing on the trustee duties of “care, skill and 
caution” in delegating, and imposing fiduciary duties directly on the 
agent, provides sufficient protection for the beneficiary.85  Nowhere do 
 
 83 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 (1994) provides: 
(a)  A trustee may delegate investment and management functions that a prudent 
trustee of comparable skills could properly delegate under the circumstances.  The 
trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in: 
(1)  selecting an agent; 
(2)  establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, consistent with the 
purposes and terms of the trust; and 
(3)  periodically reviewing the agent’s actions in order to monitor the agent’s 
performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation. 
(b)  In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the trust to exercise 
reasonable care to comply with the terms of the delegation. 
(c)  A trustee who complies with the requirements of subsection (a) is not liable to the 
beneficiaries or to the trust for the decisions or actions of the agent to whom the 
function was delegated. 
 84 Id. at § 9 cmt.  
 85 The comment to section 9 of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act states: 
There is an intrinsic tension in trust law between granting trustees broad powers that 
facilitate flexible and efficient trust administration, on the one hand, and protecting 
trust beneficiaries from the misuse of such powers on the other hand. . . .  If the trustee 
delegates effectively, the beneficiaries obtain the advantage of the agent’s specialized 
investment skills or whatever other attributes induced the trustee to delegate.  But if the 
trustee delegates to a knave or an incompetent, the delegation can work harm upon the 
beneficiaries. 
  Section 9 of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act is designed to strike the 
appropriate balance between the advantages and the hazards of delegation. . . .  Section 
9(a) imposes duties of care, skill, and caution on the trustee in selecting the agent, in 
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they make the case that the beneficiary, rather than the trustee, should 
bear the risk of loss of an insolvent agent. 
The drafters also recognize that allowing broad delegation powers 
may create costs for the beneficiaries.  As they state, 
the trustee must be alert to protect the beneficiary from “double 
dipping.”  If, for example, the trustee’s regular compensation 
schedule presupposes that the trustee will conduct the investment 
management function, it should ordinarily follow that the trustee will 
lower its fee when delegating the investment function to an outside 
manager. 
Thus, they opt for a rule that places all of the monitoring costs on the 
beneficiaries, and that leaves decisions about the trustee’s proper 
compensation to the integrity of the trustee. 
 
III.     MODIFYING FIDUCIARY RULES 
A.     Different Standards for Different Trustees 
 
We have seen that the identity of the trustee is an important factor 
in determining how courts apply fiduciary standards.  It also plays an 
important role when courts confront various conflicts arising from a 
second issue: to what extent are fiduciary standards modifiable by the 
parties to the trust document?  In recent years it has become fashionable 
to describe fiduciary standards as “default rules” around which the 
parties can freely draft.  However, to equate fiduciary rules with true 
default rules, such as those found in the UTC, would be an error.86  
Even scholars and the drafters of the UTC who have embraced the 
“default rule” rhetoric admit that there are, and should be, some limits 
on parties’ ability to waive or modify the rules.87  To date, they have 
 
establishing the terms of the delegation, and in reviewing the agent’s compliance.  The 
trustee’s duties of care, skill, and caution in framing the terms of the delegation should 
protect the beneficiary against overbroad delegation.  
Id.  The comment also states: 
Although subsection (c) of the Act exonerates the trustee from personal responsibility 
for the agent’s conduct when the delegation satisfies the standards of subsection 9(a), 
subsection 9(b) makes the agent responsible to the trust.  The beneficiaries of the trust 
can, therefore, rely upon the trustee to enforce the terms of the delegation.  
Id.   
 86 See generally Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2. 
 87 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 
1105, 1111-17; 1121-25 (2004).  Langbein acknowledges the need for a narrow mandatory 
regime to deal with potential trustee fraud, id. at 1124-25, and suggests that policies against 
perpetuating inefficient dead-hand control might justify a court’s refusal to enforce a settlor’s 
directive to concentrate trust investments in only one asset (a waiver of the duty to diversify).  Id. 
at 1111-17.  He also suggests that concern for effectuation of settlors’ intent justifies Uniform 
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offered no theoretical justification for limiting fiduciary duties at all.  In 
a recent article, I have offered a theoretical framework for determining 
whether and to what extent particular fiduciary rules can be modified.88  
In the following paragraphs, I draw on that theory to explore how the 
identity of the trustee should be a factor in evaluating the extent to 
which fiduciary rules can be modified. 
I argue in the following paragraphs that the asymmetrical 
information problem and concerns for settlors’ intent justify treating the 
modification issue differently depending on the trustee’s identity.  I 
conclude that there is little justification for allowing professional 
trustees to hide behind broad protective waivers, but that such waivers 
are more justifiable when the trustee is a non-professional, and that the 
majority of courts understand this.  Transaction-specific waivers are less 
problematic, although courts rightly construe them more strictly against 
professional trustees.  Finally, I submit that certain statutory 
developments over the last twenty years create default rules for 
institutional trustees that lack the wisdom of the common law and create 
risks for all beneficiaries. 
 
1.     Professional Trustees 
 
Parties’ attempts to modify fiduciary standards can take various 
forms.  Some trust provisions are broadly worded attempts to decrease 
fiduciary standards.  An example would be a provision that exculpates 
the trustee from liability for loss stemming from the trustee’s acts, 
except for acts taken in bad faith or with reckless disregard for the 
beneficiaries’ interests (hereinafter, I will call these types of non-
specific waivers “broad waivers”).  Other modifications are carefully 
limited and transaction-specific; for example, a settlor may transfer into 
trust shares of stock in a corporation in which the trustee has an interest 
and relieve the trustee from the no further inquiry rule with respect to 
those investments.  Or, the settlor may have an undiversified portfolio 
consisting of stock in the settlor’s closely owned family business and 
may absolve the trustee from liability for failing to diversify, or from 
liability for loss in value of the stock (hereinafter, “transaction-specific 
waivers”). 
As we have seen, when the settlor engages a professional trustee, 
the negotiation process is often characterized by stark information 
asymmetries.  Because a trust provision reducing fiduciary duties or 
 
Trust Code provisions that do not allow a settlor to waive trustee’s duty to act in good faith, or to 
waive all of the trustee’s fiduciary duties.  Id. at 1121-25. 
 88 Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2. 
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exculpating the trustee is inconsistent with the premise of the 
relationship, settlors who are not well counseled are unlikely to spot it, 
or if they spot it, to understand its likely effect. 
In determining what the limits on a professional trustee’s ability to 
modify fiduciary protections should be, one thing is clear: there are few, 
if any, good reasons for a settlor to agree to a broad exculpatory clause 
that dramatically raises a professional trustee’s threshold of liability.  
The essence of the transaction is the settlor’s desire to retain an expert 
level of service for his beneficiaries.  Nor would a settlor have much 
reason to authorize the trustee to profit from its position without 
advance approval.  Generally, then, broad waivers are inconsistent with 
settlors’ desire to retain professional management.  Often, the very 
existence of a broad exculpatory clause in a trust document may be 
evidence that the parties had unequal access to information during the 
negotiation process.89 
When a professional trustee insists on a broad waiver, a fully 
informed settlor might have three possible motivations for agreeing.90  
For the first two, a broad waiver is a sub-optimal solution, a fact that the 
settlor’s attorney would presumably explain.  First, believing that a 
particular beneficiary is unstable or unduly litigious might lead a settlor 
to reduce that beneficiary’s incentive to litigate by absolving the trustee 
of liability for negligent management.  Reducing the level of care that 
the trustee owes to all beneficiaries is a less appealing solution than 
carefully limiting the trustee’s discretion to make distributions to that 
beneficiary, or alternatively, including a carefully drafted clause 
imposing consequences for frivolous litigation on particular 
beneficiaries.  Second, a trustee might insist on a limitation on trustee 
liability as a condition to taking on certain investments, an insufficiently 
diversified portfolio, or investments in which the trustee has an interest.  
Here again, a transaction-specific modification authorizing the 
investments and protecting the trustee from liability only for losses 
stemming from those specific investments is the best solution. 
Third, a settlor might (conceivably) agree to a reduced standard of 
care, or authorize the fiduciary to profit from its position, because a 
professional trustee insists upon it.  An informed settlor presumably 
would seek something in exchange, such as lower trustee fees.  In these 
presumably rare instances, enforcement of a broad waiver would be 
proper only if the trustee presented clear evidence that the settlor had 
full information concerning the meaning and likely effect of the 
clause.91  The best evidence, of course, would be evidence that the 
 
 89 Id. at 100-04. 
 90 For a fuller analysis of this topic, see id. at 101-04. 
 91 Id. 
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trustee offered the settlor two prices for two different services: one 
commission for full-service trusteeship, and a lower commission for an 
agreement that includes an exculpatory clause lowering the standard of 
care or authorizing trustee self-dealing.92  Placing the burden on the 
trustee would create a disincentive for reflexive use of broad waivers, 
would force disclosure during bargaining when the trustee believes that 
a clause is necessary, and would induce the settlor to obtain independent 
advice about the meaning of the clause. 
On the other hand, transaction-specific waivers, such as a clause 
that authorizes the trustee to hold a particular investment in trust, and 
exculpates the trustee for loss if that investment loses value, are more 
likely than broad waivers to be the product of negotiation.  Because 
these narrow clauses raise less concern about information problems, 
courts should be more willing to enforce them. 
Thus, the optimal rule for professional trustees will force full 
disclosure during the negotiation process.93  Absent clear and 
convincing evidence of full disclosure, broad waivers of entire duties 
(such as the duty of care) almost never should be enforced. 
Note that this rule is not necessary to protect the majority of 
settlors, who will have attorneys who bargain strenuously to protect 
them.  Very high net worth individuals, who often have attorneys who 
look out for their interests generally, and other settlors who have 
capable counsel will not need the benefit of this approach because 
counsel will insist that they agree to a broad waiver only in the rare 
circumstances where such a clause advances their best interests.  The 
rule is necessary for those who are either unrepresented or inadequately 
represented. 
 
2.     Non-Professional Trustees 
 
The asymmetrical information problem is less likely to exist when 
the settlor chooses as trustee a non-professional associate or family 
member.  In this situation, the settlor chooses the trustee because the 
trustee has a relationship with the settlor and the objects of the settlor’s 
bounty, and can be trusted to make discretionary decisions about the 
beneficiaries’ respective needs.  Individual trustees of this sort are 
unlikely to be trustees of other trusts, are less likely to participate in 
drafting the trust’s terms, and are likely to be on a level playing field 
 
 92 See Coffee, supra note 5, at 1623 (stating that “courts should uphold opt-out provisions 
that deviate from traditional fiduciary standards only when they can find that the term has been 
accurately priced”); see also id. at 1666-68 (discussing difficulties with accurate pricing). 
 93 See Sitkoff, supra note 15. 
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with the settlor in terms of sophistication.  When the settlor chooses a 
non-professional trustee, therefore, information problems are unlikely to 
be significant. 
When a broad waiver is contained in a trust document that names a 
non-professional trustee, it should be less cause for concern.  There are 
good reasons for settlors to immunize non-professionals from liability 
for actions taken in good faith.  When the settlor chooses the trustee 
because he trusts her to provide the best care for family members and 
make responsible distribution choices, that trust, and not an expectation 
of expert investment skills, may be the essence of the relationship.  The 
settlor may wish to immunize her for good faith mistakes, especially 
when she is not getting compensated.  Reducing the liability standard 
may also be necessary to induce a non-professional to perform the role. 
Because information asymmetries are unlikely to be a significant 
problem in most cases, even broad waivers should be enforced.  Given 
that information problems are less serious and the need for exculpation 
is greater, it is important to give settlors and their non-professional 
trustees more leeway to draft around fiduciary rules in order to 
effectuate the settlor’s purpose.  Courts interpreting waivers in these 
trusts should approach the issue as though they were interpreting a 
contract. 
 
B.     Common Law, Common Sense 
 
Conventional wisdom holds that courts generally enforce 
exculpatory clauses in trust documents regardless of the trustee’s 
identity.94  Although courts occasionally do seem to reflexively honor 
these clauses,95 the vast majority of courts do not take such a cavalier 
approach when a professional trustee attempts to avoid liability by 
invoking a broad waiver.  For starters, a few state courts have flatly 
refused to uphold broad exculpatory clauses to protect professional 
trustees from liability when they have acted negligently.96  Some judges 
 
 94 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222, reporter’s notes (1959). 
 95 See, e.g., Warren v. Pazolt, 89 N.E. 381 (Mass. 1909).  
 96 New Jersey courts have determined that, as a general matter, an exculpatory clause cannot 
relieve a trustee from liability “where a loss results from negligence in the administration of a 
trust.”  Behrman v. Egan, 95 A.2d 599, 601 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1953) (citing Liberty Title & 
Trust Co. v. Plews, 60 A.2d 630 (N.J. Ch. 1948)); see Dickerson v. Camden Trust Co., 53 A.2d 
225 (N.J. Ch. 1947), aff’d, 64 A.2d 214 (N.J. 1949); see also Semler v. Corestates Bank, 693 
A.2d 1198 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (holding the trustee liable for negligence on the 
ground that the trustee’s negligent acts fell outside the scope of protection the exculpatory clause 
provided).  The Alabama Supreme Court has held that “although a trustee’s duties and obligations 
are governed largely by the trust agreement, that agreement cannot be employed to vitiate ‘the 
duty imposed by the ‘prudent person’ standard.’”  First Ala. Bank of Huntsville, N.A. v. Spragins, 
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have taken more extreme action: in the 1930s, New York Surrogates 
drafted and advocated for a statute,97 still on the books, that codified the 
Surrogates’ view that exculpatory clauses in testamentary trusts violate 
public policy.98  Legislative history suggests the Surrogates believed 
that professional trust companies were routinely including boilerplate 
exculpatory clauses in trust instruments, that settlors did not understand 
the meaning of the provisions,99 and that settlors’ attorneys failed to 
protect their clients’ interests in an effort to obtain repeat business from 
the trust companies.100  Other courts, while not going so far as to 
 
515 So. 2d 962, 964 (Ala. 1987) (holding that a trust provision cannot alter the trustee’s duty to 
use reasonable care in making and managing investments). 
 97 According to a letter written by Surrogate Wingate to Governor Lehman, the bill was 
drafted by Surrogates Wingate, Foley, and Delehanty.  The Surrogate’s Association of New York 
State approved the bill.  Letter from Surrogate George Albert Wingate to Governor Herbert H. 
Lehman (Apr. 1, 1936) (on file with The Association of the Bar of the City of New York library). 
 98 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-1.7 (McKinney 1967).  That section provides: “(a) 
The attempted grant to an executor or testamentary trustee, or the successor of either, of any of 
the following enumerated powers or immunities is contrary to public policy: (1) The exoneration 
of such fiduciary from liability for failure to exercise reasonable care, diligence and prudence.”  
Id. 
 99 Surrogate Wingate argued that: 
the chief vice [with exculpatory clauses] arises from the fact that the average testator 
neither sees nor understands these clauses nor the effect that they may produce among 
his dependents.  He is primarily concerned with the fact that certain dependents are to 
receive, as he believes, certain portions of his property, and is content to leave to the 
attorney drawing the will the administrative portions thereof.   
Letter from Surrogate George Albert Wingate to Governor Herbert H. Lehman, supra note 96.  In 
another letter, Surrogate Wingate argued that the testator in the vast majority of cases had not 
“any remote realization of the fact that he was subjecting the property upon which his dependents 
must look for support, to potentially serious jeopardy.”  Letter from Surrogate George Albert 
Wingate to Governor Herbert H. Lehman (Apr. 21, 1936) (on file with the Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York library); see also REP. No. 6.11A, Leg. Doc. (1965) No. 19, pp. 499-501 
(quoting legislative history establishing that the purpose of the statute was “to protect testators 
and the objects of their bounty from the untoward effects of ingeniously contrived clauses, the 
full legal consequences of which are seldom appreciated at the time of the execution of the wills 
containing them”). 
 100 As one Surrogate put it: 
the drawing of wills . . . has to perhaps a preponderant extent fallen into the hands of 
lawyers who are either actively engaged in work for these financial institutions or 
hopefully anticipate such retainers.  As a result, men who are more and more coming to 
do the work of testamentary draftsmanship, have come to view the wills they are called 
upon to draw from the standpoint of the corporate fiduciaries whom they expect to 
represent, rather than from that of the testator and the persons, whether dependents or 
otherwise, whom he desires to benefit. 
Letter from Surrogate George Albert Wingate to Governor Herbert H. Lehman, supra note 98.  
Surrogate Wingate further argued that 
these corporate fiduciaries in too many instances view the entire matter [of drafting a 
will with a testamentary trust provision] not so much as a sacred trust upon which the 
welfare of the beneficiaries, and indeed, at times, their very existence depends, as just 
another piece of business to be handled in a routine way, frequently by underpaid 
clerks, lacking both experience and sound judgment. 
Id. 
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expressly prohibit broad waivers, construe them very narrowly against 
professional trustees, imposing liability on the ground that the trustee’s 
conduct falls outside the scope of the clause’s protection.101  When 
creative trustees have argued that broad waivers relieving them of 
liability for acts taken in good faith permit them to self-deal, courts have 
rejected the argument. 
Moreover, the cases most often cited to support the proposition that 
exculpatory clauses are enforceable do not, when read carefully, support 
that generalization.  In fact, a more accurate reading of the case law is 
that courts “uphold” exculpatory clauses and shield trustees from 
liability if the case falls into at least one of the following categories: 
1) the trustee was not in fact negligent at all;102 
2) the “trust” is not a prototypical private express trust, but part 
of an arm’s length business arrangement;103 
3) the modification was a carefully drawn, transaction-specific 
modification of the trustee’s fiduciary duty and the conduct 
complained of fell squarely within the clause’s protection;104 
 
 101 See McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 2002) (considering a trust provision that 
protected trustee from liability for negligence, and concluding that trustee was liable for breach of 
trust because “[a] reasonable construction of these provisions . . . is that the Lois Trustees were 
exculpated for ordinary negligence, but not the duty to (i) inform beneficiaries or (ii) treat them 
impartially”); In re Williams’ Trust, 591 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding validity 
of exculpatory clause shielding trustees from liability from errors in judgment, but finding that 
trustee’s failure to sell declining stock for over four years, even though stock comprised majority 
of trust’s assets, could constitute a breach of fiduciary duty because failure was not “an error in 
judgment” but might amount to “negligence”); Behrman, 95 A.2d 599 at 601 (citing Liberty Title 
& Trust, 60 A.2d 630); Villard v. Villard, 219 N.Y. 482 (1916) (holding that clause purporting to 
shield trustee from liability for retaining investments originally held by settlor did not shield him 
from liability for failing to sell investments that it did not know were not part of settlor’s estate); 
Bauer v. Barernschmidt, 187 A.D.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that exculpatory clause 
did not protect trustee from liability for making certain negligent expenditures); In re Rushmore’s 
Estate, 21 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Sur. Ct. 1940) (holding that an exculpatory clause directing that trustee 
would not be held liable “for any act done . . . in good faith hereunder” did not shield trustee from 
liability for “non-legal” investments); Jewett v. Capital Nat’l Bank of Austin, 618 S.W.2d 109 
(Tex. App. 1981) (holding that an exculpatory clause relieving trustee of liability for investing in 
speculative stocks did not shield the trustee from liability for negligence in failing to diversify the 
trust’s assets).   
 102 See, e.g., Kimball v. New England Trust Co., 14 Conn. Supp. 432 (Super. Ct. 1947); 
Powell v. Cocowitch, 94 So. 2d 589, 591-92 (Fla. 1957); In re Nuese’s Estate, 96 A.2d 298 (N.J. 
1953); Blauvelt v. Citizens Trust Co., 71 A.2d 184 (N.J. 1950); In re Clark’s Will, 177 N.E. 397 
(N.Y. 1931); In re Cowles’ Will, 255 N.Y.S.2d 160, 172-73 (App. Div. 1965); Matter of City 
Bank Farmers Trust Co., 61 N.Y.S.2d 484 (App. Div. 1946); Spring v. Hawkes, 41 A.2d 538 (Pa. 
1945).   
 103 See, e.g., Gardner v. Squire, 49 N.E.2d 587 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942). 
 104 See, e.g., Perling v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 300 S.E.2d 649 (Ga. 1983); Bartlett v. 
Dumaine, 523 A.2d 1, 11 (N.H. 1986) (upholding exculpatory clause because “Dumaines ‘is a 
unique trust, having features of both a trust and a corporation,’ and . . . ‘[s]ince the Dumaines 
Trustees are to establish and carry on businesses, the settlor clearly intended that the ‘prudent 
[person] rule’ of investment would not be applicable’”); Farr v. First Camden Nat’l Bank & Trust 
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4) the settlor or beneficiary gave advance approval for the 
trustee’s acts;105 or 
5) the trustee was a non-professional.106 
In short, most courts intuitively understand the asymmetrical 
information problem, and allow professional trustees to hide behind 
exculpatory clauses only if there is evidence that the settlor had full 
information, the trustee obtained advance approval, or the trustee is a 
non-professional.  But understanding courts’ approach requires a careful 
reading of the case law and a willingness to disregard blanket 
statements found in treatises.  Because the message of the case law may 
be murky, a clearly drafted statute could go a long way in clarifying the 
rule.  This would create additional incentives for professional trustees to 
make full disclosure about any exculpatory provisions they wish to 
insert in the trust documents. 
Similarly, another creature of the common law works to ensure that 
professional trustees make full disclosure before they act in a way that 
is inconsistent with fiduciary duties—the no further inquiry rule.  By 
imposing strict liability for self-dealing without advance approval, the 
rule creates the strongest possible incentives to make full disclosure.  
Courts’ approach to the duty of care and the duty of loyalty make 
eminent sense. 
 
C.     Statutory Shortcomings 
 
The UTC sets some limits on the parties’ ability to modify or 
eliminate fiduciary rules.  Yet the relevant Code provisions, read 
together with the comments, fail to take sufficient account of the 
differences between professional and non-professional trustees. 
The UTC begins by emphasizing that it is largely comprised of 
default rules.  With respect to fiduciary duties, the Code sets limits on 
the parties’ abilities to waive or modify fiduciary standards.  Section 
105(b)(2) and (3) dictate that the parties may not waive “the duty of the 
trustee to act in good faith and in accordance with the purposes of the 
trust” nor “the requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of 
the beneficiaries.”107  Taking a cue from the Second Restatement,108 
 
Co., 66 A.2d 444 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1949); In re Cowles’ Will, 22 A.D.2d 365, 378 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1965); Hoffman v. First Va. Bank, 263 S.E.2d 402 (Va. 1980). 
 105 In re Leupp, 153 A. 842 (N.J. Ch. 1931). 
 106 See Pearson v. Barr, No. D037414, 2002 WL 1970144 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2002); 
Crabb v. Young, 92 N.Y. 56 (1883); In re Mallon’s Estate, 89 N.Y.S. 554 (Sur. Ct. 1904); 
Biddulph v. Delorenzo, No. 83808, 2004 WL 1902725 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2004). 
 107 The Comments explain: 
Subsection (b)(2) provides that the terms may not eliminate a trustee’s duty to act in 
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section 1008 of the UTC provides that an exculpatory clause relieving 
the trustee from liability for breach of fiduciary duty is enforceable, 
except to the extent it relieves the trustee of liability for acts taken in 
bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust.109 
Thus, the Code gives the parties wide latitude to modify or 
eliminate trustees’ fiduciary duties.  For example, it is clear that the 
parties can relieve the trustee from liability for negligence.  Taken 
literally, the Code also allows the parties to authorize the trustee to 
profit indiscriminately from its position of trust, as long as the trust 
profits as well.  The drafters do not explain why they place any limits on 
the parties’ ability to contract, nor do they explain why they draw the 
lines where they do.  Perhaps they were cognizant of information 
 
good faith and in accordance with the purposes of the trust.  Subsection (b)(3) provides 
that the terms may not eliminate the requirement that a trust and its terms must be for 
the benefit of the beneficiaries.  Subsection (b)(2)-(3) are echoed in Sections 404 (trust 
and its terms must be for benefit of beneficiaries), 801 (trustee must administer trust in 
good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes and the interests of the 
beneficiaries), 814 (trustee must exercise discretionary power in good faith and in 
accordance with its terms and purposes and the interests of the beneficiaries), and 1008 
(exculpatory term unenforceable to extent it relieves trustee of liability for breach of 
trust committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust 
and the interests of the beneficiaries). 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105 cmt. (2005). 
 108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959) (stating that although strictly construed, 
exculpatory provisions, absent an abuse in insertion into the trust instrument, relieve the trustee of 
liability for breach of trust unless the breach is committed in “bad faith, or intentionally or with 
reckless indifference to the interest of the beneficiary”).  Yet the fact is that most states do not 
have a rule in place that actually results in shielding trustees from liability for gross negligence.  
California and states that have followed its lead have expressly rejected the Restatement 
formulation, prohibiting by statute exculpatory clauses that purport to relieve the trustee for 
liability from gross negligence.  See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 16461(b) (West 2003) (providing 
that an exculpatory clause in a trust document “is not effective to relieve the trustee of liability (1) 
for breach of trust committed intentionally, with gross negligence, in bad faith, or with reckless 
indifference to the interest of the beneficiary, or (2) for any profit that the trustee derives from a 
breach of trust”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-512 (2003) (same as California but omitting bad 
faith).  The Official Comments to section 16461(b) of the California Probate Code state: “This 
section is the same in substance as part of Section 222 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
(1957), except that the reference to gross negligence does not appear in the Restatement.”  CAL. 
PROB. CODE § 16461(b) cmt. (West 2003). 
 109 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008 (2005) provides: 
(a)  A term of a trust relieving a trustee of liability for breach of trust is unenforceable 
to the extent that it: 
(1)  relieves the trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith or 
with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the 
beneficiaries; or 
(2)  was inserted as the result of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship to the settlor. 
(b)  An exculpatory term drafted or caused to be drafted by the trustee is invalid as an 
abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship unless the trustee proves that the 
exculpatory term is fair under the circumstances and that its existence and contents 
were adequately communicated to the settlor. 
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problems; it seems certain that no informed settlor would agree to trust 
terms that authorize reckless, bad faith behavior, or that allow the 
trustee to plunder the trust assets at will.  If information asymmetries 
justify placing limits on the parties’ freedom to contract, though, why 
prohibit only the most egregious forms of opportunistic behavior?  
Sufficient attention to differences between professional and non-
professional trustees in the trust formation process helps determine 
where the lines should be drawn. 
On its face, section 1008 of the UTC is a fairly sensible approach 
to the exculpatory clause problem for both professional and non-
professional trustees.  The model statute wisely takes steps to remedy 
information problems: in addition to placing some limits on the 
permissible scope of waivers,110 it places the burden to prove that the 
settlor was informed of the exculpatory clause squarely on the trustee 
who inserts it.  The trustee must prove both that the clause was “fair” 
and that the clause’s “existence and contents were adequately 
communicated to the settlor.”  Nothing in the language requires courts 
to abandon their traditional approach to broad exculpatory clauses.  In 
applying this statute, most courts would likely enforce limited, 
transaction-specific waivers, as well as broad waivers drafted to protect 
non-professionals.  Professionals who seek to avoid liability by 
invoking broad waivers would have the burden to prove that they made 
full disclosure to the settlor. 
The Code’s comments would be the ideal place to emphasize the 
difference in treatment of professional and non-professional trustees, 
and to reinforce the approach that a majority of courts have taken to the 
problem.  Instead, the comments suffer from a failure to take into 
account the differences between the professional and non-professional 
settings.  In so doing, they gut the protections provided for by the 
Code’s black letter, at least with respect to professional trustees. 
Specifically, the comments provide a safe harbor for trustees who 
deal with settlors represented by counsel.111  The comments create two 
conclusive presumptions about the settlor who was represented by 
counsel.  The first states that the settlor’s attorney shall be presumed to 
be the trust instrument’s drafter, even if the trustee supplied the trust 
 
 110 See Langbein, supra note 85, at 1124 (acknowledging that a waiver of trustee’s duty to act 
in good faith “must have been improperly concealed from the settlor or otherwise misunderstood 
by the settlor when propounded”). 
 111 Section 1008(b) provides that “[a]n exculpatory term drafted or caused to be drafted by the 
trustee is invalid as an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship unless the trustee proves 
that the exculpatory term is fair under the circumstances and that its existence and contents were 
adequately communicated to the settlor.”  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008(b) (2005).  The comments to 
subsection (b) indicate that it was intended to disapprove of Marsman v. Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1991), which validated an exculpatory clause that was drafted by the settlor’s 
attorney, who was also named as a trustee.  Id. at § 1008 cmt. 
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document form.112  If taken seriously, this would mean that courts can 
no longer strictly construe the waiver against the professional trustee, 
since that professional can no longer be viewed as “the drafter.”  More 
troubling, the second conclusive presumption is that the represented 
settlor had full information regarding the existence and meaning of any 
exculpatory provision.113  The comments also provide that the settlor’s 
lawyer’s knowledge of the clause shall be imputed to the settlor, 
regardless of whether the attorney actually informed the settlor about 
the clause.114  Thus, the settlor represented by inadequate counsel is 
afforded absolutely no protection from overreaching by a professional 
trustee. 
This “safe harbor” makes sense when viewed from the perspective 
of the non-professional trustee.  Because exculpatory clauses are 
generally wealth-enhancing for the settlor, and because information 
asymmetries are unlikely to be significant in this context, it makes sense 
to allow non-professional trustees to rely on the bargained-for waiver.  
The “safe harbor” makes no sense, however, for professional trustees, at 
least from the settlor’s perspective.  Responsible trustees and attorneys 
do not need the benefit of a statute that imputes knowledge to their 
clients, because they will ensure that clients have actual knowledge and 
a fair understanding of any non-standard trust terms.  The statutory 
provision benefits only those attorneys who violate ethical obligations, 
such as those who subordinate their clients’ best interests to curry favor 
with institutional trustees. 
The comments would do better to reinforce the disclosure-
encouraging approach that the common law takes.  The comments 
should distinguish between professional and non-professional trustees, 
suggest that broad exculpatory clauses rarely should be used by 
professionals, and provide that, if such clauses are used, the professional 
trustee has the burden to prove full disclosure and consent regardless of 





 112 The comments to section 1008 state that:  
The requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied if the settlor was represented by 
independent counsel.  If the settlor was represented by independent counsel, the 
settlor’s attorney is considered the drafter of the instrument even if the attorney used 
the trustee’s form.  Because the settlor’s attorney is an agent of the settlor, disclosure 
of an exculpatory term to the settlor’s attorney is disclosure to the settlor.   
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008 cmt. (2005).  
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
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There are sound reasons to have separate fiduciary standards for 
non-professional and professional trustees.  Courts intuitively 
understand this, and have developed fact-specific standards to take 
account of the particular difficulties that non-professional trustees face.  
The argument that classic fiduciary rules should be weakened to protect 
the non-professional should be rejected; generally, courts offer adequate 
protection to non-professionals.  Traditional fiduciary rules, such as the 
no further inquiry rule and the prohibition against delegation of the 
investment function, grew organically from the need to compensate for 
information asymmetries and market imperfections in the trust context.  
Because the UTC and other statutes gut those strict standards, they will 
generate serious costs for beneficiaries in the coming years.  To the 
extent those statutes suggest that courts ought to abandon the sensible 
common law approach to fiduciary duty issues, they are severely 
misguided. 
 
